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Abstract. This article uses data from the social survey Allbus 1998 to introduce a method
of forecasting elections in a context of electoral volatility. The approach models the
processes of change in electoral behaviour, exploring patterns in order to model the
volatility expressed by voters. The forecast is based on the matrix of transition probabilities,
following the logic of Markov chains. The power of the matrix, and the use of the mover-
stayer model, is debated for alternative forecasts. As an example of high volatility, the
model uses data from the German general election of 1998. The unification of two German
states in 1990 caused the incorporation of around 15 million new voters from East Germany
who had limited familiarity and no direct experience of the political culture in West
Germany. Under these circumstances, voters were expected to show high volatility.
Keywords: Forecast, Election, Volatility, Markov models, Germany
1. INTRODUCTION
The reunification of the German Democratic Republic (GDR/East Germany) with
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG/West Germany) was in many ways a social,
economic, and political earthquake. From a political and electoral point of view,
reunification caused new cleavages throughout the political culture, including with
regard to the electorate’s understanding of the political system and the ideas that the
parties represented. Peter Mohler (1994) has pointed out that political divides were
already a very powerful theoretical concept in Germany before reunification, and
other researchers (Pappi, 1990) demonstrated such divides’ traditional influence in
the electoral decisions of German voters. Religion, social class, gender, education,
income and geographical location were all associated with specific electoral
behaviour. However, Mohler expressed serious doubts about their relevance in
predicting the voting behaviour of the new electorate from the East.
One relevant approach in the electoral forecast literature in Germany is the
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Noelle-Neumann theory about the Spiral of Silence (Kort-Kriger and Mundt, 1986;
Mohler, 1994; Noelle-Neumann, 1990). However, the modeling approaches inspired
by this theory are not useful in a highly volatile context because they do not take into
account strong changes in electoral behaviour. For example, the Lake Constance
model assumes that some voters hide their electoral preferences and uses the results
from the last election to weight the poll in an effort to correct this systematic error.
After comparing voters’ recall of their vote in the previous election with the
electoral results in the current election, some weights are estimated. The consequence
of this process is to “smooth” the change.
Obviously, the newcomers from East Germany had no previous experience
with West German parties. Moreover, their ideological understanding of left and
right was very different from their neighbors’ in the West (Alaminos, 2011), and it
would take time before East Germans could learn the new ideological and political
codes. The electoral model used to forecast election results had to somehow
consider the high volatility introduced in the electoral system by the new voters, as
most political parties participating in the 1998 elections were still aligned with the
old, traditional political parties established before reunification.
The political system in Germany was, for a long time, an example of stability.
Conradt, Kleinfeld and Soe (2000) wrote, “During the past half-century, few
electorates in Western democracies have been more stable or predictable than that
of the Federal Republic” (p. 10). The two main political forces, the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) and the conservative bloc of Union parties (CDU/CSU),
alternated in the government, while the liberal party (FDP) had participated in
several coalitions since 1949, helping the CDU or the SPD to hold the government.
In that sense, the political system of Germany followed a well-known model in
political science, with two main political parties and a small third party that
determined the balance of power between them. In fact, the FDP has been in the
German federal government longer than any other political party, due to distinct
coalitions with the CDU/CSU (1949–56, 1961–66, 1982–98, and 2009–13) and the
SPD Party (1969–82). The electoral law that regulated the 1998 election can be
easily explained as follows:
“As with the old system, every voter gets two votes. The first allows voters to
choose their candidate of choice in their district. The second is for the party they
support. Every candidate who wins in one of the country’s 299 districts—based
on voters’ first votes— automatically gets a seat in parliament. This means that
every district sends a lawmaker to Berlin.
“The rest of the Bundestag’s base number of 598 seats is allocated based on the
percentage of the vote received nationwide—based on voters’ second votes.
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Only parties that surpass the five percent threshold are allowed to send
representatives to Berlin based on the second-vote count. It is this percentage
that will be announced on election night and which determines the ultimate
make-up of parliament. The five percent threshold is intended to prevent
fragmentation and to keep extremist parties like the National Democratic Party
(NPD) from entering into parliament” (Spiegel Online International, 2013).
Traditionally, electoral research focuses on the second vote. Table 1 shows the
electoral results as a percentage of the valid second ballots. In the 1949 national
election, there was only one vote, so results are not really comparable.
Table 1. German Bundestag election results, 1949-1998
Election Participation CDU / CSU SPD FDP Greens PDS REP Others
 (%)  (%)  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
August
14, 1949 78.5 31.0 29.2 11.9 - - 27.9
September
6, 1953 86.0 45.2 28.8 9.5 - - 16.5
September
15, 1957 87.8 50.2 31.8 7.7 - - 10.3
September
17, 1961 87.7 45.3 36.2 12.8 - - 5.7
September
19, 1965 86.8 47.6 39.3 9.5 - - 3.6
September
28, 1969 86.7 46.1 42.7 5.8 - - 5.4
November
19, 1972 91.1 44.9 45.8 8.4 - - 0.9
October
3, 1976 90.7 48.6 42.6 7.9 - - 0.9
October
5, 1980 88.6 44.5 42.9 10.6 1.5 - 0.5
March
6, 1983 89.1 48.8 38.2 7 5.6 - 0.4
January
25, 1987 84.3 44.3 37 9.1 8.3 - 1.3
December
2, 1990 77.8 43.8 33.5 11 5.1 2.4 2.1 2.1
October
16, 1994 79.0 41.4 36.4 6.9 7.3 4.4 1.9 1.7
September
27, 1998 82.2 35.1 40.9 6.2 6.7 5.1 1.8 4.2
Source: Author’s compilation. Data from http://www.wahlrecht.de/ergebnisse/bundestag.htm
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At the same time, many authors consider this election as a turning point in the
electoral system that emerged after reunification. As Conradt, Kleinfeld and Soe
(2000) point out, “The 1998 election could well turn out to be a milestone in the
political development of Germany’s Federal Republic” (p. 12). Norpoth and
Gschwend (2010), in the process of developing a forecasting system for the German
elections with a longitudinal structural model, also questioned what data to use for
the model. Their model was inspired by several designs created to forecast
presidential elections in the United States, so they concentrated on estimating the
vote for one party. For their model, they needed a temporal series with the results
of the main political parties.
“Yet another problem arises from unification, in 1990. Should we use the vote
in the newly unified Germany for elections since then or stick to the vote in the
old Federal Republic? Again, for practical reasons, we decided to keep the
continuity of the vote series intact until 1998. Beginning with the 2002 election,
we have ended this exclusion and begun relying on the vote in the unified
Germany” (Norpoth and Gschwend, p. 43).
Gibowski (2000) also concluded that the “East-West differences in voting
behaviour, so noticeable during the 1990 and 1994 elections, actually declined in
1998” (p. 115). In that sense, Norpoth and Gschwend consider the 1998 election as
the last step in the process of unifying the electorates from West and East Germany.
Other authors, like Conradt, Kleinfeld and Soe (2000), also considered the 1998
election to be special. Gibowski (2000) summarizes its impact:
“For the first time in the history of German election, a change of federal
government has been brought about as a direct consequence of a general
election. The 1998 general election produced greater shifts in the percentage of
votes received by the CDU/CSU and the SPD than any previous national
election. After the 1994 election the Christian Democrats were ahead of the
Social Democrats by five percent. Now the situation is virtually reversed. The
SPD overtook the CDU/CSU in both western and eastern parts of Germany and
replaced it as a governing party” (p. 114).
In fact, the 1998 election shows the effects of increased electoral volatility,
which emerged as a major factor. Gibowski continues, “The volatility of voter
behaviour that has grown steadily over several decades and then more rapidly since
the 1990 unification, will make it difficult in the future for the major parties to be
certain of receiving the same kind of electoral support they enjoyed in the past” (p.
133). Table 2 shows the data for the 1987, 1990 and 1994 elections to the Bundestag.
The data are expressed in absolute terms. Reunification added 15,108,578 eligible
voters for the 1990 election, and participation grew by 8,770,621 (compared to the
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1987 elections). So many millions of new voters greatly influenced the electoral
results of the traditional parties, while the system also underwent changes due to the
new political parties in the Bundestag. One of them, the PDS, was well known
among eastern voters, who had lived under the rule of its predecessor, the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany (SED), until 1990. Another relevant political party during
this period was the Republikaner, founded in 1983 and ideologically close to the
extreme right.
Table 2. German Bundestag elections, 1987-1994: Census, participation and results
1987 1990 Differences 1994 Differences
election election between election between
elections: elections:
1990 -1987 1994-1987
Registered voters 45,327,982 60,436,560 15,108,578 60,452,009 15,124,027
Participation 38,225,294 46,995,915 8,770,621 47,737,999 9,512,705
CDU-CSU 16,761,572 20,358,096 3,596,524 19,517,156 2,755,584
FDP 3,440,911 5,123,233 1,682,322 3,258,407 -182,504
SPD 14,025,763 15,545,366 1,519,603 17,140,354 3,114,591
A90/Green 3,126,256 2,347,407 -778,849 3,424,315 298,059
PDS - 1,129,578 1,129,578 2,066,176 2,066,176
Republikaner - 987,269 987,269 875,239 875,239
Others 535,154 1,504,966 969,812 823,527 288,373
Source: Author’s compilation. Data from http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de
Considering the electoral changes that brought on the increase in new voters,
a strong mobility can be observed in electoral support towards traditional political
parties. The aggregate volatility, defined as the number of voters that change parties
between two given elections, was 22.6% between 1987 and 1990. This is the highest
percentage of mobility in the electoral history of Germany and can easily be
explained by the increase in the census and the associated participation. But if we
compare the results of the general elections in 1990 and 1994, this time without the
effect of the big jump in participation, we see that 14.8% of the electorate changed
their vote once again, in an apparent transfer of preference between political parties.
Because data are aggregated, we must also take into account the resulting
ecological fallacy of these measurements, which very probably underestimate voter
mobility. This is also the case with the Pedersen Index of Volatility, whose
calculations are consistent with the present study’s estimates on these elections,
despite using percentages instead of absolute terms. The fact is that when two voters
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crisscross political parties from one election to another, the change is invisible in
the aggregate. That said, the main point of interest is not the transfer of votes from
one party to another one, but rather the high volatility in the results for all the
political parties and the generally limited stability in the support received by the
traditional parties. This apparent movement in the electorate supports the hypotheses
regarding the ideological disorientation of newcomers.
In Table 3, several dynamics can be observed. First, the vote to the leftist
parties SPD and PDS (socialist and communists) increased in absolute terms both
in 1990 and 1994. The liberal FDP and the conservative CDU/CSU bloc (Christian
Democrats and Christian Social Union) also had positive increases in the first
elections after unification but lost votes in 1994. The main electoral benefit in the
1990 election was for conservatives and liberals, suggesting that the concepts of
democracy and liberalness appealed to citizens from East Germany. At the same
time, the coalition had led the unification process, a fact that generated considerable
support among the new voters.
Table 3. Changes in party support between elections in Germany, 1987–1994
Party 1987-1990 1990-1994
CDU-CSU 3,596,524 -,840,940
FDP 1,682,322 -,1,864,826
SPD 1,519,603 1,594,988
A90/Green -788,849 1,076,908
PDS 1,129,578 936,598
Republikaner 987,269 -,112,030
Others 969,812 -,681,439
Absolute change 10,663,957 7,107,729
Percentage of vote that moves across elections 22.6% 14.8%
Source: Author’s compilation. Data from http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de
Eight years after unification, however, some citizens may have felt disenchanted
with the real ideological beliefs of conservative parties. Moreover, the high
economic expectations that unification generated in the East were also in crisis. The
result was that the learning process entailed in adapting to the new political culture
also implied inevitable changes to it, and this process of acculturation among East
German voters caused considerable electoral volatility. Weins (2000) concludes,
“In the 1998 election, the east German vote was again characterized by a particularly
high degree of volatility–mainly to the disadvantage of the CDU” (p.66). Yet,
Conradt, Kleinfeld and Soe (2000) point out that the process of volatility started in
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the early 1980s: “The three elections of the 1980s saw major changes in this stable,
if not tranquil, electoral landscape” (p. 10). The two main political parties began to
lose support, and new ideologies coalesced around issues such as the environment,
disarmament or civil liberties. The unification just accelerated the process of
change.
For example, in the 1990 general election following reunification, the FDP
increased its vote by 1,682,322 units. Four years later, its share decreased by
1,864,826 votes. This considerable mobility was widely – and, as it turned out,
correctly – expected to repeat itself during the 1998 election. Gibowski (2000) said
afterwards that, for the German case, “Relatively stable general election results are
a thing of the past.” For that reason, “In the future, the outcome of general elections
will be more unpredictable than in the past” (p. 134). Conradt, Kleinfeld and Soe
(2000) agreed with that opinion: “The German electoral landscape in 1998É bore
little resemblance to the stable and predictable patterns of the ‘old’ Federal
Republic. The classic cleavages of class and religion continued their slow decline,
but generational and regional influences became more significant issues. Candidates
and media became critical short-run factors” (p.10).
Characterizing the electorate (and especially the social climate) is the first
step towards choosing among the many different methods for forecasting elections.
The most common models, especially in commercial research, are based on
electoral polls. These models use combinations of weighting, filtering and
imputations in order to estimate the electoral outcome. A different approach is to
use time series and structural analyses. In any case, for working out an electoral
prediction, it is essential establishing some presumptions about society; evolutionary
or stationary situations (like Germany before unification) are not comparable to
volatile situations, with high voter mobility or high probabilities of abstention (or
participation). In a context of high volatility, it can be challenging to calculate the
probability of voters’ choosing one party over another. In the end, analysts have to
decide between models that suppress change and models that allow some degree of
freedom for volatility and voter mobility. In the end, all forecasting models have to
deal with change and stability.
In the case of forecasting models based on electoral polls using weights,
filters and imputation systems, the difficulties in modeling high volatility have
caused some authors to conclude that the best estimates are those closest to the
election. After analysing the 1998 election, Gibowski (2000) concluded, “Election
analysts and polling institutes will need to be more aware that their polls will not
be able to predict the intentions of floating voters with reasonable accuracy until
shortly before the election” (p. 134). This statement may be true when the modeling
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approach produces several measures that monitor electoral change. In fact, the
analysts followed the process of change but also maintained that, in the case of high
volatility, “the last measurement is the best.” Table 4 shows several forecasts for the
1998 general election, using models based on polls.
Table 4. Final predictions of major public opinion polling organizations, 1998 German
general election (percentage values)
Actual 2nd IFD EMNID FGW Forsa Infratest
vote result Allensbach Bielefeld Mannheim Berlin München
1998
27 Sept. 25 Sept. 21 Sept. 18 Sept. 24 Sept. 25 Sept.
SPD 40.9 40.5 41 39.5 42 40.5
CDU 35.1 36 39 37.5 38 38.5
Green 6.7 6 6 6 6 6.5
FDP 6.2 6.5 5 5.5 5 5
PDS 5.1 5 5 4.5 4 4.5
Others 6 6 4 7 5 5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Gibowski (2000)
If we consider the performance of the forecasts in terms of absolute error, we
see that the best forecast is from a poll performed two days before elections (25
September), netting a total error of only 2.4 percentage points (IFD Allensbach). In
the weeks before elections, FGW Mannheim attained an absolute error of 6.8%; the
Infratest München, 7.3%; and the EMNID Bielefeld and Forsa Berlin, 8%. Based
on these results, it seems that the accuracy of forecasting models depends on timing,
and that volatility cannot really be modeled. For that reason, Gibowski considers
that in the case of Germany, “Polls taken well in advance of Election DayÉ will only
be able to describe the mood of public opinion at the time and will have little long-
term predictive value” (p. 134).
Gibowski’s observation is highly pertinent to commercial polling and the
mass media, which follow a “horse-race” approach to elections that tends to
sensationalize the campaign itself rather than analyse the merits of the candidates.
The conclusion that the “last forecast is the best” is largely a consequence of the
methods, which aim to improve the last forecast using a sequence of surveys. The
presumption is that as the elections draw nearer, voters’ preferences are consolidated,
reducing volatility. However, if the model concentrates only on measuring the
evolution of the process, it will be impossible to understand the process itself.
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In fact, many different factors may have contributed to the volatility of the
1998 election besides the reunification of Germany. For one, it is likely that horse-
race coverage fed into the unstable electoral climate, and vice versa. In that sense,
forecasting an uncertain future may have generated an atmosphere of uncertainty
and volatility at the time. Compared to previous elections, Semetko and Schoenbach
(2000) wrote, “[1998] could not have been more different. First, it was a much more
competitive election, with polls showing a change of government as the most likely
outcome for many months leading up to Election Day”. Some of the forecasts done
months before election introduced the idea of change. Weins (2000) stated:
“The 1998 electoral campaign for the German Bundestag was quite a thrill.
Since precise predictions as how the three small parties in the Bundestag (FDP,
Alliance ‘90/Greens, PDS) were going to fare were hardly feasible, and in view
of the federal electoral system, virtually any coalition seemed possible. In the
end, the electorate cast a clear vote, which came as a surpriseÉ Equally
surprising was the result of the PDS: while in previous elections the successor
party of the SED managed to enter parliament only by winning direct mandates
in at least three constituencies, this time it succeeded in clearing the so called
‘five-per-cent hurdle’” (p. 48).
Another approach to forecasting, used by Norpoth and Gschwend (2010), is
based on a longitudinal structural model. However, high volatility undermined its
predictive value:
“The relationship between long-term partisanship and incumbent vote is quite
strong (r = 0.55)É To be sure, some elections do not fit especially well. One
would not expect long-term orientations to offer much guidance for voting in
1953, only the second election of a new political system. This is an incumbent
victory that one would predict to derive primarily from short-term forces.
Similarly, an incumbent defeat, as in 1998, registers in an electoral showing far
below the normal-vote prediction. All in all, long-term partisanship is not
correlated with the vote in any given election strongly enough for it to be used
as the sole predictor” (p. 44).
Norpoth and Gschwend included three predictors: “the popularity of the
incumbent chancellor, the long-term partisan balance in the German electorate and
the cost of ruling, as captured by the tenure of the government in office.” Although
the model’s main predictor is partisanship, the volatile side of the equation
(popularity and the cost of ruling) outweighs it. This forecast method cannot really
be applied to the 1998 election because it did not consider the behaviour of East
German voters, but only electoral data from West Germany. Inspired by the models
for forecasting presidential elections in the U.S., this model is clearly limited in the
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German context, as acknowledged by its creators: “Given the small number of
Bundestag elections and five parties with a parliamentary representation these days,
there is no way to use our model to predict the vote shares of all of the parties.” This
is a crucial limitation, especially in the case of Germany, where coalitions are an
important part of the political culture.
As we have seen, the models using electoral polls, and those based on time
series, consider volatility to be a problem. Of course, without change it is easy to
produce a good forecast. The solution proposed, in the case of the models based on
electoral polls (weighting, screening, imputation) is clearly inefficient. The approach
of simply monitoring change, in the belief that the best forecasts are those done just
before elections, cannot be considered an adequate method. In the case of time
series, the structural approach has serious difficulties in modeling volatility. Short-
term impacts and sudden changes in the electoral climate are difficult to include in
a long-term model. Weins, analysing the 1998 election, stated that
“In comparison to the short-term factors, socio-structural determinants exerted
only a surprisingly minor influence on the results of the election (1998) in both
parts of Germany. However, short-term factors seem to be more important in the
east than in the west. In the future, therefore East German voting behaviour can
be expected to be as volatile as in previous elections” (p. 67).
The method introduced here focuses on the two main dimensions: change and
stability. Rather than monitoring change through successive polls, it aims to model
the process of change itself. This approach assumes that electoral volatility is the
result of a process, and that process has a pattern. The dynamic of change can be
modeled, and the electoral forecast can anticipate the future state of the process.
Rather than considering change (volatility) to be a problem, this approach
aims to model it, making it an ideal forecasting method for electoral situations with
high volatility. In fact, the method is very dependent on theory. Democracy is
predicated on choice, and elections and change are closely related concepts. The
methods that consider volatility as a problem for forecasting are inherently biased
in favor of stability. While methods that model change (like time series from a
structural approach) are highly sensitive to impacts that occur in between elections,
models that use polling data focus on the improvement of the last measure to
produce a forecast. In summary, the approach based on Markov chains aims to
model change itself. Volatility is fully integrated into the estimation process.
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2. THE MODEL
Our model sets up a matrix of transition probabilities (P) to model the change.
This matrix will be used to define a Markov chain with finite states and explore the
effects in the election forecast. The departure point is a vote to a particular political
party in one election, while the destination state is the vote in the following election.
For a finite number of states, the matrix of transition probabilities can be represented
by a matrix P, where any element (i,j) in the matrix is equal to
pij = Pr (X n+1 = j | Xn = i)        (1)
and P is a matrix of probabilities. The probabilities i,j for the time t are estimated
by raising the matrix to the power t, Pt.
In order to apply this analysis, we have to make the usual assumptions for a
Markov chain model. First, the matrix of transition probabilities does not change.
The process moves from one stage to the next ruled by the same matrix. Thus, the
pattern of change that we estimated from the sample survey will be the same until
the election. The second assumption is that the state of the process at any given stage
depends only on these constant transition probabilities and people’s state at the
immediately preceding stage. Another assumption is that the population is closed.
This means that we don’t expect abrupt changes in the census between elections.
In this case, the model applies the pattern of change to members of the electorate
who were able to vote in the last election (they were in the census of registered
voters). The method has several limitations for the 1990 election, principally due
to the influx of new voters from East Germany. As in the case of Norpoth’s
forecasting model, it is possible to use a matrix of transition built with the volatility
pattern of the electorate from West Germany, comparing the recall of vote in the
1987 elections to the intention of vote in the 1990 election. However, carrying out
a massive imputation of the volatility pattern of Western electors onto the Eastern
electorate is against the logic of the model.
If we raise the matrix P to power t (when t tends to be infinite), the matrix will
reach a state of equilibrium, where all rows are equal. This equilibrium doesn’t
mean that the process has stopped; it simply means that the maximum possible
number of voters have moved from one political party to another, that is, one party
has lost all of its votes. This extreme constitutes the limit of voter volatility.
A second analysis of interest is to define a row vector with the result of the
previous elections. In this way, we may define an initial probability row vector f(0).
This vector, if premultiplied with the matrix P, gives the first forecast fP(1):
fP(1) = f(0) P (1)  (2)
176 Alaminos A.F.
The procedure takes the first stage (election results) and applies the matrix of
transition probabilities to redistribute the vote. If the pattern of change is well
determined, the forecast may be refined through the consideration of changes in
participation. The forecast of scenarios may consider raising the power of the
matrix to explore futures, especially if forecasting elections in the long term.
fP(t) = f(0) P (t) (3)
Finally, it is possible to improve the forecast considering the idea of Blumen,
Kogan and McCarthy (1955) about movers and stayers. These analysts produced a
revised Markov type model, based on the assumption that some voters have a high
degree of fidelity to one political party (stayers), while other voters move between
parties more freely (movers). In the standard Markov chain, we assume that all the
voters can change. It can be useful to correct the model to include the idea that there
are certain restrictions to mobility. In this case, we will apply the matrix P only to
those with probabilities of change, and then add the proportion of stayers.
We define a diagonal matrix S, with the proportion of stayers in the main
diagonal and zero in all the other positions. The proportion of voters who change
will be given by the identity matrix I, minus matrix S. The corrected matrix M is
the result of
M = S + (I - S) P (4)
The effects on the matrix M are an overestimation on the main diagonal. In
this case, the model reduces the volatility, slowing the change and giving a more
conservative forecast. If we want to move the model M forward, we have to raise
the power of P. We move as many stages as powers we use. To move t steps in the
future (a way to give some motion to this braked model), the following formula is
used:
M(t)     = S + (I - S) P (t) (5)
Again, the smoothed matrix M can be pre multiplied by f(0) to produce a
forecast fM(1):
fM(1)= f(0) M (1) (6)
In general, for stage t:
fM(t) = f(0) M (t) (7)
As we can see, we may use Markov chains with finite states to model electoral
systems with high volatility. Model (2) provides the most freedom, producing
forecasts that allow strong electoral swing. Models (6) and (7) include change in the
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forecast model, but more conservatively.
With this model, one of the crucial points is the estimation of the matrix of
transition probabilities. This matrix contains the structure, the pattern of change
that rules the process. As we will see later, there are many different ways to improve
this matrix using empirical data and different weighting or imputation procedures.
3. APPLYING THE MODEL TO FORECAST THE 1998 GERMAN
ELECTION
In the German general elections, there are two votes: one for candidates (constituency)
and one for a political party. Electoral surveys define the intention to vote as the
second kind, or the vote to a party list. Let’s consider the following contingency
table (Table 5). The rows divide the total votes obtained by each party in the 1994
elections according to those voters’ intentions in the 1998 elections. The values at
the intersection of two like parties (e.g., SPD ´ SPD) represent a crude estimation
of the stayers (those whose vote will not change between 1994 and 1998), while the
remaining values correspond to the movers who intend to vote for other parties. This
is a well-known vote transference matrix.
Both variables, vote recall in the last election and voting intention in the next
election, have been studied extensively. In a way, they are the core data of almost
all the forecasting models based on electoral polls. However, the recall of vote is
highly sensitive to many factors. For example, the individual may remember a
different election (national, Lander, European or local) or just try to conceal their
electoral behaviour. Many models use the real results on the past election to weight
the sample, modifying the structure of the survey to adjust vote recall.
In the Markov model, and in this case, the matrix is built using raw data to
simplify the presentation of the model. Obviously, the model can be adapted using
any of the procedures developed to correct bias in the measurement. In the case of
the recall of vote, the most usual procedures have to do with weighting. Another
important element is the variable that measures the intention of vote to a political
party. In this case, the main task is to produce systems of imputation. This is the
usual case with the answers “do not know” or “no answer” to a question on voting
intention. To correct these answers, for example, one option is to impute a
probability of vote to a political party using different measurements (identification
with political party, sympathy, party one prefers to win the election, etc.). In short,
the goal is combining information to impute an electoral preference. All these
procedures, weights and systems of imputation can be used to refine the two main
dimensions considered in this method of modeling.
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The categories in the contingency table have been collapsed to show only the
transference of vote between political parties. The options of abstention, white/
blank vote have been suppressed. Again, this decision has been taken to simplify the
presentation of the method. In fact, the recall of vote and the intention of vote may
define a square matrix in all but one group: first-time voters. The new voters from
the East in the 1990 election are a clear example. In the case of new political parties,
voter intention can be collapsed in the category “others.” The categories of
abstention, white/blank vote are options that appeared both in the variables
measuring the recall of vote and in the intention of vote.
When the categories of abstention, white/blank votes are included in the
matrix of transference, a new forecast appears: the participation level. The same
model simultaneously produces an estimation (forecast) of participation and a
forecast of the distribution of votes among political parties. In this way, the volatility
that comes from abstention and participation (between elections) is included as a
part of the process. This is a clear option that emerges from the method.
As we said, in this case, to introduce the model and focus on it, we directly
use the raw data from the poll. The absence of any weight or imputation will
obviously produce a less accurate forecast, but even so, it is striking how well it
works. Any procedure that refines the measurement of the two main variables will
improve it even more, achieving a better model for the pattern of volatility.
Table 5. Party voted (1994) and intention of vote (1998) (percentage values)
Intention of vote for the next general election in 1998
Party voted CDU SPD FDP B90/Green PDS Republi Other Total
in 1994 kaner
CDU 74.4 18.5 2.2 0.9 1.30 1.6 1.0 100
SPD 1.7 92.6 1.1 2.1 2.10 0.3 0.1 100
FDP 17.1 16.3 58.7 2.2 1.10 3.3 1.1 100
B90/Green 1.9 25.0 3.1 66.9 1.90 0.6 0.6 100
PDS 0.0 9.6 0.0 1.2 89.20 0.0 0.0 100
Republikaner 0.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 9.10 68.2 9.1 100
Others 5.9 29.4 5.9 0.0 0.00 5.9 52.9 100
Source: author analysis. Data from Allbus1998
Table 5 is easily converted into a matrix of transition probabilities. Maintaining
the same order (row and column) for the political parties as shown in Table 5, the
P matrix is:
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.744 .185 .022 .009 .013 .016 .010
.017 .926 .011 .021 .021 .003 .001
.171 .163 .587 .022 .011 .033 .011
.019 .250 .031 .669 .019 .006 .006
.000 .096 .000 .012 .892 .000 .000
.000 .136 .000 .000 .091 .682 .091
.059 .294 .059 .000 .000 .059 .529
The results of the 1994 general election in Germany (party list) are reported
in Table 6.
Table 6. Electoral results from the 1994 general election, Germany (percentage values)
CDU-CSU 41.43
SPD 36.40
FDP 6.92
B90/Greens 7.27
PDS 4.39
Republikaner 1.86
Others 1.75
100
Data from http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de
Again, we may express the last result as a vector of probabilities f (0)
(.414 .363 .069 .072 .043 .018 .017)
We may now start to apply the model to forecast the 1998 electoral result. Of
course, we use a simplified matrix. As stated above, it is possible to use several
methods (weights and systems of imputations) to refine the matrix of probabilities
P. It is also possible to include more categories (for example, abstention) by
increasing the number of states in the model. To produce the first forecast  fP(1):
fP(1) = f (0)  P (1) (2)
(.414 .363 .069 .072 .043 .018 .017) .744 .185 .022 .009 .013 .016 .010
.017 .926 .011 .021 .021 .003 .001
.171 .163 .587 .022 .011 .033 .011
.019 .250 .031 .669 .019 .006 .006
.000 .096 .000 .012 .892 .000 .000
.000 .136 .000 .000 .091 .682 .091
.059 .294 .059 .000 .000 .059 .529
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We obtain the vector (.3285 .455 .057 .062 .056 .024 .016), which, as an
electoral forecast, means that the CDU would get 32.8%; SPD, 45.5%; FDP, 5.7%;
the Green Party (Grüne), 6.2%; PDS, 5.5%; Republikaner, 2.4%; and other political
parties, 1.67%. The forecast, moving into the future (two steps), will produce an
even stronger change:
fP(2) = f (0)  P (2), (3)
that is (.2640 .5204 .0486 .0559 .0678 .02630 .0157).
The next approach considers the Blumen, Kogan and McCarthy (BKM)
correction, where the matrix of probabilities is applied only to those voters who are
expected to move (to vote differently in the next election). To produce a quick
estimation of movers and stayers, we are going to use the main diagonal of matrix
P as an estimation of stayers. We use again raw data without any refining procedure.
There are many different ways to determine the stayers. For example, in their
forecasting model, Norpoth and Gschwend (2010) decided that “the long-term
partisan support for the governing parties in the German electorate is measured as
follows: the average vote in the last three Bundestag elections”. In their case, they
use an average of the electoral result, but many different procedures (and operational
definitions) can be applied instead. For example, poll information and the electoral
results may be combined to produce a probability for the voters that do not change
(for example, with the prior and subsequent Bayesian probabilities). The decision
about how to estimate the stayers the level of loyalty to political parties is a
fundamental issue that has to be decided by the analyst. In this case, we use raw data
and take the main diagonal in the contingency table, used to define the matrix of
probabilities of transition, as an estimation of the stayers.
We will define a new matrix S, where the main diagonal contains the values
on the main diagonal of P, and set the values off diagonal to zero. This way, movers
(volatile voters) are defined by a matrix (I - S) where I is the identity matrix and S
is the matrix previously defined. Finally, after the correction we get a new matrix
M that produces a smoothed forecast.
M(t) = S + (I - S) P (t) (5)
The effects, which reduce the change, can be observed in the main diagonal,
where the values are higher than in the original matrix of transition probabilities P
(see Table 7).
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Table 7. Matrix M
M = S + (I - S) P
0.93 0.04736 0.005632 0.002304 0.003328 0.004096 0.00256
0.001258 0.995 0.000814 0.001554 0.001554 0.000222 0.000074
0.070623 0.067319 0.829 0.009086 0.004543 0.013629 0.004543
0.006289 0.08275 0.010261 0.890 0.006289 0.001986 0.001986
0 0.010368 0 0.001296 0.988 0 0
0 0.043248 0 0 0.028938 0.899 0.028938
0.027789 0.138474 0.027789 0 0 0.027789 0.778
Source: Author’s analysis
The electoral forecast, after this correction of P, is more conservative:
fM(1) = f (0)  M (1) (6)
and attains (.3914 .3961 .0612 .0669 .0466 .0201 .0157).
One of the advantages of this model, which slows the changes, is to produce
a good forecast in volatile situations. In fact, it usually allows a longer-term forecast
because the process is slowed. Let’s consider a second step in this model. To do that,
we have to raise the power on P:
M(2) = S + (I - S) P (2 (7)
and then  fM(2) = f (0) M (2)  with the electoral forecast of  (.3767 .4189 .0562 .0634
.0494 .0183 .0146)
In this case we have used the logic of Markov chains, pushing forward the
M matrix. But another possibility aims to use better estimates of movers and
stayers. The use of the BKM correction assumes a realistic presumption: there is a
robust electorate that is loyal to its party preferences. At the same time, this
approach allows the modeling of the two main parameters in a volatile context:
change (movers) and stability (stayers). This analytic approach has the advantage
of maintaining more control over the process. In that sense, there is no need for
continuously monitoring public opinion, as long as the pattern of change (captured
by the matrix of probabilities of transition) is consistent in the future.
4. DEBATING THE MODEL
The two main goals of the method presented here are to model the process of change
and to produce a good forecast of the electoral results. In a way, the achievement
of the second objective is an indicator of the success of the first. When evaluating
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the performance of a modeling method, and especially this one, we have to
remember that we use raw data. These forecasts are, strictly speaking, a consequence
of the Markov model, without any improvement.
If we compare different models, we can observe that the corrected models
(BKM) behave better than the pure Markov chain model. However, all the Markov
forecasts show voting trends in the right direction, behaving better than those
produced by other techniques in terms of predicting the winning party and the
position of the second and third parties. Compared to alternative forecasting
methods (time series and polls) the Markov model has several advantages. First,
because even in the case of high volatility, it can generate an accurate forecast
several months before the election. Second, it only needs one poll, so it is cheaper
to carry out than several electoral surveys would be. Third, the model reveals
relevant patterns in the dynamics of the electorate. Fourth, it produces alternative
scenarios for the future, depending on the doses of change and stability. Fifth, the
model assumes change is a natural part of democracy, rather than considering it as
a problem, and is capable of modeling that change.
In terms of alternative forecasts, Gibowski (2000) summarizes, “The major
polling organizations predicted that the SPD would emerge ahead of the CDU/CSU
as the strongest party, and almost all of them correctly indicated which party would
come third.” The four forecasts with Markov chains (even the worst of them) were
right about the position of the first, second and third political parties. With regard
to the PDS (which ended up with 5.1% of the vote, just over the minimum threshold
for representation in the Bundestag), Gibowski observes, “Three of the five polling
institutes in question thought the PDS would end up with less than 5 percent.” On
the other hand, two of the four forecasts with Markov chains predicted that the PDS
would be over the 5% threshold, and a third estimated a share of 4.95%. In general,
considering vote distribution and political parties’ ranking, the Markov model
performed well, especially considering that it was based on raw, uncorrected data.
The final results of the 1998 general election in Germany were: CDU 35.2%, SPD
40.9%, FDP 6.2%, Greens 6.7%, PDS 5.1% and others 5.9%. In Table 8 we can
compare the results with the forecasts.
To evaluate the performance of the model, in Table 9 we compare the forecasts
with the 1998 electoral results. The differences, expressed in percentages, are
combined in absolute values. The pure Markov models fares poorly, with an
absolute error of 11.46% compared to the election results. If we take the model a
step further, the forecast moves in the right direction, but overestimates the increase
and decrease in the votes to political parties, resulting in a misfit of 27.28% in the
absolute error. The main contributions to this error are the estimations of the
dominant parties.
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Table 8. Comparison of four Markov model forecasts, 1998 German general elections
(percentage values)
Forecast*
1998 results fP(1) (%) fP(2) (%) fM(1) (%) fM(2) (%)
CDU-CSU 35.14 32.80 26.4 39.14 37.67
SPD 40.93 45.50 52.0 39.61 41.89
FDP 6.25 5.70 4.86 6.12 5.62
B90/Greens 6.7 6.20 5.59 6.69 6.34
PDS 5.1 5.60 6.78 4.66 4.94
Republikaner 1.84 2.40 2.63 2.01 1.83
Others 4.04 1.60 1.57 1.57 1.46
100 99.80 99.83 99.80 99.75
* The total differs from 100 due to rounding.
Table 9. The absolute errors of the four forecasts, 1998 German general elections
(percentage values)
Forecast
1998 results fP(1) fP(2) fM(1) fM(2)
CDU/CSU 35.14 -2.34 -8.74 4 2.53
SPD 40.93 4.57 11.1 -1.32 0.96
FDP 6.25 -0.55 -1.39 -0.13 -0.63
B90/Greens 6.7 -0.5 -1.11 -0.01 -0.36
PDS 5.1 0.5 1.68 -0.44 -0.16
Republikaner 1.84 0.56 0.79 0.17 -0.01
Others 4.04 -2.44 -2.47 -2.47 -2.58
Total 100 11.46* 27.28* 8.54* 7.23*
* Sum of absolute values.
The corrected models are logically more accurate. Just one correction to the
Markov model (for stayers and movers) produces a forecast with an absolute
difference of only 8.54%. The main source of error is the estimation of the CDU/
CSU results. There is an overestimation of the stayers; we imputed too much
stability in the conservative electorate. In the case of the corrected Markov model,
in two steps, the total error is 7.23%. This model fits best because it introduces more
volatility into the conservative electorate. The forecast of the results for the “other”
political parties are always underestimated.
In summary, the Markov models, and especially the corrected models that
consider voter loyalty to political parties, are useful in forecasting elections with
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high volatility because they are designed to model the processes of change.
Volatility is not a problem, but an opportunity to identify the patterns and structures
that determine voter mobility. At the same time, modeling the process allows the
development of simulations that shed light on electoral change and volatility.
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